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Self-inflicted debt crises
Abstract
Optimal resolution of debt crises requires bailouts to account for borrowers’ time-inconsistency. We show
in a dynamic model of strategic default that myopic borrowers undervalue their option to default by a
U-shaped error, which causes excessive leverage, imperfect consumption smoothing, underinvestment in
normal times, and risk shifting in crisis times. Optimal bailouts either punish or reward myopia through
smaller or larger transfers, leading to procrastinated default and protracted crises or the reverse, depending
on whether financial transfers exacerbate or alleviate the borrowers’ misperception of default risk. The
model shows that borrowers and lenders ultimately self-inflict debt crises through their strategic interac-
tion, myopic distress can be cheaper to resolve than rational distress, and myopia can benefit stakeholders.
JEL: H63, G01, G4, D86
Keywords: borrower myopia, time-inconsistency, strategic default, debt crisis, bailout fund, real options
Debt crises are a recurrent phenomenon that affect a variety of borrowers, including sovereigns, banks,
corporations, and consumers with devastating economic and social consequences. The Covid-19 pandemic
is no exception even if its source is different from past crises. The G20 countries have provided over $10tn
in short-term support to the public sector, businesses, and individuals since March 2020 (see Figure 1 for
G-20 debt-to-GDP).1 Much of this new debt are bailouts to avoid outright defaults and spillovers to other
borrowers. In the last major debt crisis, ECB and IMF spent over AC400bn on debt relief and set up new
bailout agencies, including European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and Single Resolution Board (SRB).
When borrowers are fully rational the existing literature prescribes how bailout agencies can resolve
debt crises (Mella-Barral and Perraudin, 1997; Mella-Barral, 1999; Bolton, 2016; Bolton and Oehmke,
2018; Lambrecht and Tse, 2019). However, the restructuring of debt and optimal resolution of debt crises
cannot holistically be addressed without considering borrower myopia. Myopia is an empirical regularity
on intertemporal choice (Ericson and Laibson, 2019) and manifests itself in borrowing either as a behav-
ioral trait of individuals (Laibson, 1997; DellaVigna and Malmendier, 2004) or as the result of a political
system that sacrifices the future for short-term benefits (Aguiar and Amador, 2011). It is known that my-
opic behavior induces undersaving, overinvestment, and procrastination (Phelps and Pollak, 1968; Alesina
and Tabellini, 1990; Grenadier and Wang, 2007; Laibson, Maxted, and Moll, 2020). Yet, an analysis is
missing of how time-inconsistent borrower behavior affects the resolution of debt crises, including the
optimal bailout scheme and size of the bailout fund. Any bailout agency, may it be the IMF, World Bank,
Federal Reserve, ECB, ESM, or SRB, faces a policy tradeoff when faced with a distressed borrower: Gen-
erous financial transfers provide a quick fix to a looming debt crisis, but they are expensive and encourage
repeated pleads for debt relief. How myopia alters this tradeoff is our focus.
This paper develops a continuous-time equilibrium model of debt crises that a myopic borrower and
rational lenders, represented by a bailout agency, self-inflict through their strategic interaction. We develop
this intuition in a dynamic Stackelberg game of repeated defaults and financial transfers by an agency that
minimizes intertemporal bailout costs with non-commitment. The optimal bailout scheme takes the form
of an ex-post incentive-compatible financial transfer contingent on the borrower’s myopia and wealth.
1IMF staff, 2020, “G-20 report on strong, sustainable, balanced, and inclusive growth,” retrieved at https://www.imf.
org/external/np/g20/pdf/2020/110220.pdf.
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The model provides a novel mechanism for how bailouts strengthen or weaken borrowers’ incentives
to strategically default and, ultimately, deepen debt crises and slow down recovery. We highlight two debt
crisis dynamics: At one extreme, a debt spiral occurs in which expected wealth growth is procyclical and
negative for low wealth, generating a point of no return beyond which default becomes inevitable. At
another extreme, a trap occurs in which expected wealth growth is countercyclical and positive for low
wealth, generating economic stagnation for long periods of time. The equilibrium dynamics depend on
whether time-inconsistency alters the policy tradeoff in ways that amplify or ameliorate debt crises.
At the core of our mechanism is that myopic borrowers endogenously misprice their option to default.
The pricing error has a U-shape and is negative at all times which makes a myopic borrower act as if it
was richer than it actually is. The default mispricing distorts the borrower’s timing of default and alters
the optimal bailout scheme. Contrary to what one might expect, for a fixed bailout the borrower’s wealth
threshold that triggers default is invariant to myopia. In turn, given the equilibrium default threshold,
there exists a target wealth level post-bailout, so that the curvature of the optimal bailout schedule is
independent of myopia. Myopia affects default through the bailout agency’s endogenous response, given
its lack of commitment, to the borrower’s myopia by shifting the intercept of the bailout schedule and,
respectively, the equilibrium response of the myopic borrower to the bailout offered. In this sense, lenders
and borrowers self-inflict debt crises through their strategic interaction.
The strategic interactions between borrower and lenders unfold with bilateral non-commitment.2 Nei-
ther the borrower can commit on its post-bailout decisions, nor the agency can commit on its future bailout
policy. This assumption is motivated by the observation that austerity measures are often hard to enforce
and empirically the threat of spillovers results in prolonged episodes of debt relief.3 We allow for two
types of default. In a hard default, the borrower loses access to financial markets and enters autarky. Hard
default yields immediate benefits for troubled borrowers at the expense of loss of access to borrowing and
2It is well known that commitment resolves distortions caused by time-inconsistent preferences (Ericson and Laibson, 2019).
3The European debt crisis is a prime example. Article 125 of the Lisbon Treaty states that the European Union (EU) shall not
be liable for the commitments of [...] any Member State. A Member State shall not be liable for the commitments of [...] another
Member State. From this rule it looks clear that all countries are responsible for their own debt, and no country has to rescue
another. Still, the disclaimer has proven vacuous. The IMF, ECB, and Eurogroup granted bailouts to Ireland in 2010, Greece in
2010, 2012 and 2015, and other Eurozone countries between 2011 and 2016.
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future bailouts.4 In a soft default, the bailout agency provides debt relief through financial transfers, which
guarantees the debt. Debt renegotiation frictions and the threat of a hard default keep the borrower from
requesting financial aid excessively. The bailout agency designs an incentive-compatible financial trans-
fer schedule in a stationary Markovian subgame perfect Nash equilibrium to minimize intertemporal debt
crises costs. We focus on the dynamic Stackelberg game in which the borrower moves first by request-
ing financial aid and the bailout agency responds by a take-it-or-leave-it offer that is contingent on the
borrower’s wealth in default. The agency makes bailout offers, keeping in mind the potential for default
recidivism. The expected time to next default depends on the borrower’s time-inconsistent consumption,
investment and borrowing decisions post-bailout.
The borrower exhibits short-term bias which emerges as the result of an intrapersonal game between
“selves” of the borrower (Luttmer and Mariotti, 2003) that arrive over time at a fixed Poisson rate. The
borrower discounts the consumption of future selves disproportionately compared to the current self. De-
cisions are taken with instantaneous gratification preferences (Harris and Laibson, 2012), which is the
limit of quasi-hyperbolic preferences when tenure of selves becomes infinitesimally short. In this setup, a
single parameter captures the borrower’s degree of myopia, which facilitates analytical tractability while
nesting time-consistency as a special case.
Myopia distorts the borrower’s intertemporal consumption, saving, borrowing, and default decisions.
In contrast to rational borrowers, myopic borrowers imperfectly smooth consumption by overconsuming
more in good times than in bad times. Myopia thereby creates a retractive force that, like a rubber band,
pulls time-inconsistent borrowers back into distress and inflicts serial default (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009).
This rubber-band effect is akin to distance-to-default-dependent discounting and only operates when both
myopia and default options are present. Rational impatience, in contrast, exerts a constant retractive force
to consumption growth independent of distance to default.
These distortions arise from how myopic borrowers value the option to default. Myopic borrowers
overvalue the consumption claim compared to rational borrowers and undervalue the option to default.
The pricing error is U-shaped in the distance to default, as it vanishes when wealth reaches the default
4Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) document that sovereign defaults are lengthy and cluster in time. We capture this fact by
assuming that the bailout agency incurs spillover costs in a hard default.
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threshold or diverges to infinity and stays negative in between. Simply put, myopic borrowers downplay
during normal times the impact of default and behave as if they were richer than they actually are.
The borrower’s mispricing of default plays an important role in debt renegotiation. Financial transfers
are less effective at staving off default for myopic than rational borrowers, due to the retractive rubber-
band force. In turn, future expected costs of default rise with myopia. The bailout agency balances,
at the optimum, the marginal reduction in the risk-neutral default probability with the total cost of future
defaults. Optimal transfers increase with myopia when non-myopia factors make future default more likely
or costlier to the agency. Equilibrium transfers increase with myopia if spillovers are high, renegotiation
frictions are high, risk aversion is high, growth opportunities are poor, and borrower default costs are
low. Larger bailouts tend to resolve crises quickly and put the borrower back on a growth trajectory, but
incentivize earlier default and worsen overspending. Smaller transfers tend to delay default and lead to
frequent debt relief and prolong crisis, but discipline overspending.
The model yields closed-form expressions for the size of the required bailout fund and for credit
spreads. The bailout fund depends on the cost of current bailouts, the frequency of future bailouts and the
likelihood of negotiation failure, all of which depend on borrower myopia. A decomposition of bailout
costs shows that myopic distress can be cheaper to resolve than rational distress. This occurs typically
when myopia gets punished in equilibrium through a sequence of small transfers. It is not even clear that
myopia always harms all borrowers. Rational agents (e.g., equityholders or citizens) can benefit from a
borrower’s myopia. This occurs when myopia gets rewarded and debt relief occurs frequently.
[Figure 1 About Here.]
Capital markets price risky bonds and credit-linked securities, such as credit default swaps, different
when borrowers are myopic. Default-contingent claims have a mixed power-hypergeometric shape in our
model, which nests the standard power shape of Merton (1974) and Black and Cox (1976) in the limiting
case of borrower rationality. As a result, credit spread dynamics are more asymmetric than predicted by
models with rational borrowers. Credit spreads rise more slowly than rational spreads, but then spike
once the crisis starts to unfold. This behavior is in line with credit spread dynamics observed in practice.
Figure 1 documents the credit markets during the European debt crisis when Greek debt-to-GDP rose
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B.   Debt Has Increased Dramatically 
6.      Public- and private-sector debt have risen. 
• Advanced economies. As a result of the crisis 
and resulting need for policy action, in 2020 
alone, public debt is expected to shift upward 
by about 20 percentage points of GDP on 
average in G-20 advanced economies relative 
to last year, representing the highest level of 
debt since World War II (Figure 6). This 
reflects the combined effect of large fiscal 
deficits and the unprecedented decline in 
activity. Private-sector debt has also picked 
up, driven in particular by financial and non-
financial corporates and to a lesser extent by 
some households, who, together with firms, 
have attempted to smooth consumption over 
the downturn and may also have taken advantage of low borrowing costs. 
• Emerging market economies. Public debt in many G-20 emerging market economies is projected 
to rise by around 10 percent of GDP this year from last, with the more moderate increase relative 
to advanced economies partly reflecting more limited fiscal space prior to the pandemic. 
However, currency depreciations combined with sharp declines in output have led to rising 
foreign currency-denominated debt-to-GDP ratios in some economies (Mexico, Turkey) 
(Figure 7). 




Sources: Haver Analytics; IIF; IMF, Financial Soundness Indicators; IMF, World Economic Outlook; IMF staff calculations. 
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Figure 1: Bailouts during Covid-19 and debt-to-GDP and CDS spreads during European debt crisis.
The figure documents IMF public-sector debt projections following the Covid-19 pandemic (left; source:
IMF staff (2020)) and debt-to-GDP and CDS spread for Greece during the European debt crisis (right).
sharply before CDS spreads started to spike. In time series, there are two countervailing forces. Myopic
borrowers travel the distance to default faster as they consume more. The distance to default is, however,
larger when myopic borrowers efault later. As a result, standard credit metrics based on the power shape
are inadequat pr xies for default risk under myopia. In the cross section, credit prices are ceteris paribus
higher for more myopic borrowers since their recovery is slower.
Related Literature: Our model studies the implications of time-inconsistency for default and debt re-
lief, both cross-sectionally and over time. Leland (1994) offers an early analysis on debt renegotiation.
Strategic debt service and debt renegotiation have since been extensively studied in corporation finance
(Anderson and Sundaresan, 1996; Mella-Barral and Perraudin, 1997; Mella-Barral, 1999; Fan and Sun-
daresan, 2000; Lambrecht and Tse, 2019). Bolton (2016) applies the corporate finance setting to sovereign
debt based on the analogy between the fiat liability of sovereigns and corporate equity. We extend the debt
renegotiation literature is several ways. Most importantly, we consider time-inconsistent borrowers.
Grenadier and Wang (2007) study the impact of myopia on investment under equity financing in a
real options setting. Our goal is different. We solve for the joint intertemporal consumption, investment,
and borrowing of a myopic borrower and, in particular, we consider the strategic interaction with a time-
consistent bailout agency. In this regard, our modeling approach is similar to DellaVigna and Malmendier
(2004) who assume that individuals are time-inconsistent while the firm with which they contract is time-
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consistent. While Grenadier and Wang (2007) show that call option exercise always get accelerated by
time-inconsistency, which is a form of overinvestment, in our setting default option exercise gets acceler-
ated or delayed depending on economic conditions.
Our paper also relates to the political economy literature that underlines the inclination of governmental
borrowers to show preference for consumption while in office (Persson and Svensson, 1989; Alesina and
Tabellini, 1990). Based on this premise, Aguiar and Amador (2011) map the inefficiency of the political
system into a model of consumption with hyperbolic discounting (Laibson, 1997). Our model focuses
on the design of debt relief in the presence of default spillovers. Acharya and Rajan (2013) model a
myopic government that maximizes single-period public spending. They show that myopia can induce a
government to default later, since it disregards the effects of borrowing on future taxes and output. In our
model, myopia affects the default decision through its impact on bailout policy. When default spillovers
are low (high), myopia leads to late (early) default.
Default in our model happens on the equilibrium path. In this manner, our paper is related to models
of non-contingent sovereign debt. In the seminal contribution by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) external debt
financing can be sustained using exclusion from international debt markets as a deterrent for repudiation.
Later contributions by Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) and Arellano (2008) indicate that the costs of financial
exclusion are relatively small and insufficient to justify the levels of debt typically observed in the market.
Higher levels of debt can be justified by richer models that control for maturity structure and output costs
of default (Benjamin and Wright, 2009; Hatchondo and Martinez, 2009; Chatterjee and Eyigungor, 2012).5
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 sets up the model and derives the optimal
investment and financing policy outside of default. Section 2 illustrates the endogenous mispricing of
default. Section 3 explores the optimal bailout policy. Section 4 conducts policy analysis. Section 5
explores the implication of default options for growth. Section 6 explores the suitability of credit metrics
under myopia. Section 7 considers the case of risky debt and Section 8 concludes. All proofs are relegated
to an Appendix. The Internet Appendix discusses model extensions.
5Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) record the history of sovereign default since the 14th century and show that most countries
have defaulted at least once. They further show that overborrowing is pronounced in good times; serial default on external debt
is a phenomenon common to all regions of the world; and that new countries go through repeated debt restructuring before they
“graduate” to an advanced rare-default status. Our model captures these empirical facts.
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1 Model
We develop a dynamic model of debt crises featuring a myopic borrower and rational lenders that are
represented by a bailout agency. We depart from the existing literature by assuming that the borrower
seeks instantaneous gratification (Harris and Laibson, 2012). We first characterize the distortions in con-
sumption, investment, and borrowing caused by myopia, before we lay out a dynamic Stackelberg game
for debt renegotiation and characterize the Markovian subgame-perfect equilibrium.
1.1 Assumptions
Time is continuous and the horizon infinite. Financial markets for securities are complete and frictionless,
except for debt renegotiation frictions. A borrower with net wealth Wt at time t decides on consumption,




riskless and risky savings technologies. To focus on the distortions arising from default and debt renegoti-
ation frictions, we assume investment is frictionless. The investment share θt equals the fraction of wealth
invested in the risky savings technology that follows a geometric Brownian motion with drift rate µ and
volatility σ.6 The risk-free rate is r and the price of risk is ν = µ−r
σ
.
Funding gaps are financed by short-term debt that matures at t+dtwhile funding surpluses are invested
in a riskless bond. Under these assumptions, debt is riskless outside of default since it is short term and
the path of wealth is continuous. In default, debt remains riskless since it is backed by a bailout fund. We
assume the bailout agency (e.g., IMF, World Bank, ESM, SRB, Federal Reserve) has access to funding
that suffices to reimburse creditors in full. Section 7 relaxes this assumption and allows for risky debt.
Wealth dynamics at any time t before default are given by
dWt = [Wt(r + θt(µ− r))− ct]dt+ σWtθtdwt. (1)
In the remainder, we drop for notational convenience the dependence on t so long as there is no confusion.
6Throughout we consider interior optimal solutions for consumption and investment, explicitly ruling out doubling strategies
and Ponzi schemes. See Merton (1969) for an analogous assumption in an optimal consumption-portfolio allocation problem.
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In choosing its policies, the borrower faces self-control problems as it seeks instantaneous gratification
(Harris and Laibson, 2012). Specifically, the borrower has CRRA preferences over consumption c with
relative risk aversion γ, u(c) = 1
1−γ c
1−γ . Utility streams are discounted at rate ρ until a Poisson-distributed
random time τ with intensity λ at which a new self of the borrower arrives. The current self discounts
utility streams after the new self arrives using the discount factor δ × exp(−ρt) where δ ∈ (0, 1] and
γ + δ > 1. To ensure convergence of the value function, we impose a minimum bound on the subjective






)}.7 Instantaneous gratification assumes that future
selves arrive instantaneously, that is, λ → ∞. In this case, a single parameter δ captures the borrower’s
degree of myopia and the value functions become more tractable. The borrower is more time-inconsistent
when δ is lower, with the two extremes δ ≈ 0 (myopic) and δ = 1 (full rationality).
Hard vs. soft default: The borrower has the option to default on its debt and can possibly extract con-
cessions from the lenders. Hard default acts as threat point for debt renegotiations in a soft default. Either
of two default regimes, hard default and soft default can occur on the equilibrium path.
In a hard default, the borrower suffers from default costs and the lenders from the debt guarantee and
the threat of spillovers. The borrower incurs direct cost of bankruptcy, as its wealth changes from W to
W a(W ) = ω0 + ω1W with parameters ω0 and ω1 that depend on the enforcability of debt. The borrower
faces indirect costs as, for simplicity, it stays in autarky forever and can no longer borrow or lend.8 The
agency seizes assets and picks up the net costW a(W )−W from its debt guarantee. To capture the stylized
facts that default episodes are lengthy and defaults cluster in time, we allow the agency to incur indirect
costs in the form of expected spillover costs amounting to κ ≥ 0.9
In a soft default, the borrower and the agency negotiate over a bailout transfer, with the agency holding
all bargaining power. Hard default is a threat that the borrower can potentially use in these negotiations. To
7The restriction ρ > (1 − γ)(r + 1γ
ν2
2 ) is a standard transversality condition when a riskless savings technology exists
(Merton, 1969), and ρ > (1− γ)(µ− γ σ
2
2 ) is an alternative transversality condition when there is no riskless asset (Harris and
Laibson, 2012).
8The autarky assumption is not crucial for any of the results, so long as default is costly.
9Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) document that during the last two centuries at least five waves of sovereign defaults occurred.
The median duration of default episodes was 3–6 years, with a median duration of 6 (3) years pre (post) World War II. The
literature has also documented spillover effects in the financial sector for banks, corporations, and consumers.
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obtain an interior solution, we assume the debt renegotiation process is not frictionless. The assumption
seems reasonable as negotiating relief deals requires in practice the approval from several committees
and parties with sometimes conflicting incentives. Absent this assumption, the borrower would call for
financial aid any time the promised aid is positive. We incorporate debt renegotiation frictions by assuming
that the negotiations between borrower and agency fail with probability p ∈ (0, 1). Once the borrower
requests aid, it receives the financial transfer so long as the negotiations succeed and it continues operating
with access to borrowing and lending markets. If negotiations fail, the borrower enters a hard default.
Debt renegotiation We model negotiations in a soft default by means of a dynamic Stackelberg game
between the borrower and the agency in which the borrower moves first and the bailout agency responds
optimally (Mella-Barral and Perraudin, 1997; Mella-Barral, 1999). The contracting space is incomplete:
The bailout agency can incentivize the borrower through repeated financial transfers, but it can neither
impose austerity nor enforce a first-best policy. The agency can also not credibly commit with respect to
its future bailout policy.10 The setup is equivalent to the agency posting an ex-post incentive-compatible
transfer schedule T (W ) for any wealth W , and the borrower optimally responds by picking a soft default
threshold W− at which to request a financial transfer corresponding to the schedule T (W−).
In this setting, the Markovian subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in threshold strategies can be sum-
marized by the triplet
(W a,W−,W+). (2)
When a hard default is optimal, the borrower enters autarky once wealth drops to W ≤ W a. When a soft
default is optimal, the borrower chooses the wealth threshold W− at which point the borrower asks for
financial concessions. The agency responds by offering the financial transfer T (W−) that, if negotiations
10Non-commitment is a central assumption, as it puts the agency in a weak position to enforce borrower behavior in the
lenders’ interests. In an extension, we consider alternative settings in which either the agency moves first or both parties lack
commitment. In our setting, the borrower moves first by declaring soft default. The agency then decides on the bailout T . The
bailout policy is subgame perfect as it minimizes the cost to the guarantor given W . Optimal debt forgiveness, by contrast,
requires commitment by the agency. The agency is the ‘Stackelberg leader’ in this alternative setting. The agency commits to a
bailout T and the borrower decides when to plead for aid given T , that is, one solves for W (T ). When the agency can commit
to the bailout, it can directly incentivize when the borrower defaults. The results are available upon request.
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Figure 2: Model illustration. The figure plots wealth Wt over time, default threshold W−, and target
wealth threshold W+ after a bailout. The vertical red lines indicate a bailout of size T = W+ −W−. The
two figures assume different default and target thresholds (W−,W+).
are successful, improves the borrower’s financial situation to
W+ = W− + T (W−). (3)
The bailout agency acts in the interests of the lenders by designing a transfer scheme T (W ) to minimize
the size of the bailout fund which equals the intertemporal cost of rescuing the borrower, I(c;T ), by
optimally balancing financial transfers with the frequency at which the borrower requests financial aid.
Figure 2 illustrates alternative bailout policies. In the left plot, infrequent large bailouts occur when
T (W−) is large and (in equilibrium) W− is high. In the right plot, frequent small bailouts occur when
T (W−) is small and (in equilibrium) W− is low. The latter resembles a tight-leash policy in which the
lenders keep the borrower close to the default threshold in order to mitigate the incentive problem and
thereby minimize policy distortions, which tends to procrastinate default in equilibrium.
[Figure 2 About Here.]
1.2 Value functions and optimality conditions
The value function M(W ) of the myopic borrower prior to its replacement differs from the corresponding
value function R(W ) after the current borrower (or “self”) has been replaced. The concept of equilibrium
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for the dynamic game played between the different selves of the borrower is Stationary Markov Perfect
Equilibrium. Consumption and investment strategies away from the default threshold are contingent on
the only payoff relevant variable, wealth Wt. Furthermore, every self maximizes its own value assuming
that all future selves use the same policy functions.
Lemma 1 The value functions M(W ) and, respectively, R(W ) at any wealth level W above the default
threshold, W− or W a, satisfy the system of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations
ρM(W )− λ(δR(W )−M(W )) = max
c,θ
u(c) +M ′(W )[W (r + θ(µ− r))− c] + σ
2
2
W 2θ2M ′′(W ), (4)
ρR(W ) = u(c∗) +R′(W )[W (r + θ∗(µ− r))− c∗] + σ
2
2
W 2(θ∗)2R′′(W ), (5)
where c∗ are the consumption and θ∗ the investment share that maximize M(W ).
The above formulation assumes that the borrower is sophisticated enough to account for the presence
of the bias and correctly anticipates that its policies will continue to be myopic, even after its current self is
replaced by a new one. This assumption is commonly termed “sophisticated” myopia (Phelps and Pollak,
1968; Laibson, 1997). The alternative is to assume that the borrower is naı̈ve and not aware of its myopia.
The change in value from replacement by a new self, or “electoral effect,” is captured in (4) by
E(W ) = λ(δR(W )−M(W )). (6)
Instantaneous gratification assumes that future selves arrive instantaneously, i.e., λ → ∞. The follow-
ing lemma describes the limiting relation between the value function of the current self M(W ) and its
replacement value R(W ):
Lemma 2 Fix a default threshold W and let the value of the borrower upon entering hard default be
Ω(W,λ). Furthermore, assume there exists a finite limit Ω(W ) such that lim
λ→∞
Ω(W,λ) = Ω(W ). Then
lim
λ→∞
M(W )− δR(W ) = 0 and lim
λ→∞
E(W ) + (1− δ)u(c∗(W )) = 0.
As new selves arrive instantaneously, the lemma shows that the value of the current self becomes a
linear function of the replacement value. Therefore, the dynamic game between the different selves can be
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recast in terms of a single-person decision problem with value function M(W ) = δR(W ). This simplifi-
cation allows us to dispense with multiple equilibria arising from time-inconsistent consumption-savings
problems and focus our analysis on the dynamic tradeoffs in the design of optimal bailout policy. Harris
and Laibson (2012) prove a result similar to Lemma 2 when there is no default option, no riskless savings
technology, and the utility of consumption is bounded from below. Here, there exists an endogenous lower
bound on consumption for W ≥ W− (or W a) that is caused by the default option.
2 Allocation Distortions and (Mis)pricing of Default
This section shows that a myopic borrower undervalues the default claim compared to a rational borrower.
The misconception creates a gap between the private and market valuations of the consumption claim that
leads to allocation distortions. We provide the solution to the myopic consumption and investment policy
and link it to the (mis)pricing of default in this section. We use the policy functions to characterize optimal
bailout policy, equilibrium default thresholds, and bailout fund size in the next section.
2.1 Myopic consumption and investment policy
The first-order conditions for optimal consumption yield
u′(c∗) = M ′(W ) = δR′(W ), (7)
and, respectively, optimal investment satisfies






Condition (7) illustrates the static effect of myopia. Consumption is higher when δ is lower, i.e., when the
borrower is more time-inconsistent. The limiting consumption-to-wealth ratio as W →∞ equals
ψ =





γ − (1− δ)
. (9)
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It rises with myopia due to the term 1 − δ in the denominator of (9). Absent default options, there would
be an isomorphism between myopia and impatience: For every value of the consumption-to wealth ratio
that obtains under myopia, there exists a value of of the impatience parameter ρ that produces exactly
the same consumption-to-wealth ratio assuming time-consistency. Once default options are present, this
isomorphism ceases to exist because of the state-contingent nature of default.
Condition (8) shows that myopia does not change the nature of the investment policy directly but rather
indirectly. Myopia affects investment to the extent that it changes the curvature of the value function.
To provide explicit solutions, we conjecture that the equilibrium consumption policy c = c∗(W ) is
increasing in wealth and we denote by Y (c) the borrower’s subjective wealth given any level of equilibrium
consumption, defined as Y (c∗(W )) = W . One can show that Y satisfies the following linear ODE
(Karatzas et al., 1986):



















subject to two boundary conditions. At the lower boundary c− = c∗(W−) = M ′(Y (c−))−
1
γ , Y (c−) =
W−, and limc→∞ c/(Y (c)) = ψ.
The solution to (10) has the form Y (c) = c
ψ
+ Ac−γh + Bc−γh, where h and h are the negative and,


































We can discard the rapidly growing term c−γh in the expression for Y by setting A = 0. The value-
matching condition yields B = −( c
−
ψ










where the last term in expression (12) is the private valuation by a myopic borrower of a state-contingent
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Expression (12) has an intuitive interpretation. The first term measures wealth without default, and the
second term captures the impact of the option to default. Its impact on Y (c) is negative since default is
valuable and increases consumption c for any wealth level W . MDef(c) corresponds to the price of a
default-contingent claim if the borrower is rational, but not if the borrower is myopic.















Expression (14) highlights the impact of myopia on valuations.11 The instantaneous utility of consumption,
u(c), gets scaled by γ−(1−δ) instead of γ, but more importantly, subjective wealth Y (c) and its derivative
are distorted due to the misvaluation of default claims by a myopic borrower that we explore now.
2.2 Pricing of default claim
To understand the nature of the distortions arising from borrower myopia, it will be useful to explore how
a myopic borrower prices the default option. Myopic borrowers undervalue default-contingent claims
which implies that they ignore in normal times the consequences of default. To see this, consider the
shadow value of a claim on default for a myopic borrower, MDef(c) given in (13), compared to the market
price of a default-contingent derivative claim, denoted Def(c). The price of a default-contingent derivative
claim can be computed in closed form (all derivations are relegated to the Appendix), as follows:








11From the envelope condition, M ′′(W ) = u′′(c)/Y ′(c) implying a concave value function in W for every W > W−.
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where the coefficient i is the positive solution to the characteristic equation ν
2
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i2 − (r − ρ − ν2
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− (1 −




r − ρ− ν2
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− (1− δ)ψ +
√(







andH is the hypergeometric functionH(c) = 2F1(α1, α2, α3; z(c)) evaluated at the default-option wedge
z(c) = 1− ψY ′(c). (17)
The coefficient i varies with δ and coincides with h in the rational case when δ = 1. The function
H(c) in expression (15) is the main departure from the standard Merton (1974) and Black and Cox (1976)
type solution. It denotes the hypergeometric function 2F1(·) with coefficients (α1, α2, α3) derived in the
Appendix and evaluated at the default-option wedge z(c). The wedge equals z(c−) = 1 at the default
boundary and limc→∞ z(c) = 0 in good times.
The default claim can be used to illustrate how capital markets assess the borrower’s default risk and to
check how it differs from the borrower’s distorted assessment. Comparing expression (13) to the market
value of a default claim, Def(c), yields the following result.
Theorem 1 A myopic borrower undervalues the default claim compared to a rational borrower. That is,
MDef(c) ≤ Def(c) for δ < 1. In the two limits c = c− and c→∞, MDef(c) = Def(c).
Theorem 1 highlights that the (risk-neutral) probability of default under the borrower’s subjective
beliefs is lower than the one of a rational borrower, and it is lower the more myopic is the borrower. Only
in the rational case do private and market values coincide.
Theorem 1 yields that myopic borrowers act as if they were richer than they actually are. This mis-
conception creates a gap between the private valuation and the market value of the consumption claim that
is absent under rationality. Myopic borrowers overvalue the consumption claim compared to the rational
market. To see this, suppose the borrower valued the default option at its market value; wealth for a given
15








We can write the subjective wealth Y (c), which equals the private value of consumption, in terms of
the Ψ(c) claim and shadow wealth G(c) ≥ 0 as















The comparison between the expressions for Ψ(c) and Y (c) illustrates that a myopic borrower acts richer
than (s)he actually is: Ψ(c) ≤ Y (c) since a myopic borrower undervalues the default claim compared to a
rational borrower, MDef(c) ≤ Def(c).12
The consequence of the misconception is that in good times myopic borrowers ignore the consequences
of their actions on the likelihood of default. Only when default becomes imminent myopic borrowers can
no longer ignore the impact on default. Close to default myopic borrowers start to behave more like
rational borrowers. Default acts as a disciplining device for myopic borrowers. The marginal shadow
wealth G′(c) Q 0 determines the sign and magnitude of the consumption and investment distortions.
[Figure 3 About Here.]
Figure 3 illustrates the shape of G(c) (left) and its derivative G′(c) (right) as a function of the prob-
ability of default. The blue line assumes that the borrower is time-consistent (δ = 1), which represents
our benchmark economy. The red line assumes that the borrower exhibits myopia (δ ≈ 0). The shadow
12Note that Ψ(c) is not the market value of the consumption claim, since the borrower also misvalues the consumption stream.
That is, the present value of future equilibrium consumption absent default is not equal to cψ . A more elaborate decomposition
as (19) holds when Ψ(c) is market value of equilibrium consumption until default and p(c) denotes the market price of the
consumption claim. We then have
Y (c) = Ψ(c) + Φ(c) +G(c),
with
Ψ(c) = p(c)− (p(c−)−W−)Def(c), (Market value of equilibrium c∗ until default)
Φ(c) = cψ − p(c)− (
c−
ψ − p(c
−))Def(c), (Mispricing of consumption until default)
G(c) = ( c
−
ψ −W
−)[Def(c)−MDef(c)]. (Mispricing of default-contingent claim)
16





























Figure 3: Shadow wealth. The figure plots the myopic wealth gap, G(c) (left), and its marginal change
with the consumption level,G′(c) (right), as a function of the probability of default. The plot is constructed
using the parametrization (γ, ρ, r, ω0, ω1, p, µ, σ, κ) = (6, 0.02, 0.02, 30, 0.7, 0.1, 0.04, 0.1, 150). The blue
line assumes that the borrower is time-consistent (δ = 1). The red line assumes the borrower is myopic
(δ ≈ 0).
wealth G vanishes under rationality. It also disappears in the myopic case in the limit as W →∞ (that is,
when Pr(Default)=0) and at the default threshold, that is, when Pr(Default)=1 for W = W− or W a.13
2.3 Consumption and capital distortions from default options under myopia
2.3.1 Overconsumption and imperfect consumption smoothing
Myopia leads to overconsumption and imperfect consumption smoothing due to the undervaluation of the
default option (Theorem 1). The consequence is a reduction and countercyclical variation in expected
13The following two thought experiments illustrate the nature of the misvaluation. Consider an otherwise identical rational
borrower with distorted beliefs who makes two mistakes: The borrower wrongly believes the level of consumption is a fraction
1 − 1−δγ of its true value and, in addition, it assumes perfect consumption smoothing and therefore overestimates the growth
rate in consumption by its time-varying component (1 − δ)/Y ′(c). An alternative interpretation is the following: Consider
an otherwise identical borrower with distorted beliefs whose only mistake is to misjudge the consumption delta of the default
option, MDef′(c). So long as the borrower believes MDef′(c) = Def′(c), Ψ′(c) = Y ′(c) and market and private values of the
consumption claim coincide, that is, Ψ(c) = Y (c).
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r − ρ+ (1 + 1γ )ν22 − 1− δY ′(c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Imperfect smoothing
 1γ dt+ νγ dw, (20)







′(c). The last term in parenthesis captures the
imperfect smoothing through a reduction and countercyclical variation in consumption growth as Y ′(c) =
Ψ′(c) +G′(c) > 0 declines with c.
Discussion: Expression (20) shows that myopia produces a rubber-band effect: Expected consumption
growth decreases with the distance to default, as myopic borrowers overconsume more in good times
than in bad times. By contrast, rational borrowers have constant consumption growth and their tendency
to overconsume stays constant at all times. This qualitative difference between myopia and impatience
materializes because a default option is present. To understand its nature, first consider the electoral
effect (6), i.e., the change in value upon the arrival of a new self. One can easily show that the imperfect
smoothing term in (20) equals the marginal rate of substitution between present utility and the cost of a





. Expression (12) shows that there is a higher expected consumption
growth when the marginal value of the electoral effect is higher. In this case, the borrower saves against a
drop in value due to the arrival of a new self, which allows consumption to grow more over time.
The imperfect smoothing term E
′(W )
u′(c)
is higher closer to default due to the wealth effect arising from
the default option. Consumption is a constant fraction ψ of the sum of wealth and the value of the default
option (see expression (12)). Since the value of the option increases close to default, consumption is
convex in wealth. As the borrower relies more on the value of the default option in bad times to finance
its consumption, it becomes more concerned with the possibility of a new self arriving, which implies that
the marginal rate of substitution between present utility and the electoral effect increases.
[Figure 4 About Here.]
Figure 4 illustrates the consumption distortions arising from borrower myopia. The figures plot con-
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Figure 4: Imperfect consumption smoothing. The left figure plots expected consumption growth. The
right figure plots consumption normalized by expected income W (r + θ(µ − r)). The red line assumes
the borrower is myopic (δ ≈ 0). The yellow line corresponds to a patient rational borrower (δ = 1) with
sa e impatience parameter ρ as the myopic borrower. The blue line corresponds to an impatient rational
borrower (δ = 1) with higher impatience parameter ρ than the myopic borrower, calibrated so that the
consumption-to-wealth ratios in normal times are equalized.
sumption growth (left) and consumption over expected income W (r + θ(µ − r)) (right) as functions of
the endogenous distance to default. The yellow line assumes that the borrower is time-consistent (δ = 1)
and patient, which is our benchmark. The blue line captures a time-consistent borrower that is less pa-
tient. The red line captures a myopic borrower (δ ≈ 0). The impatience parameter ρ is calibrated so that
the consumption-to-wealth ratio in normal times is equal to the case of myopia. The right figure shows
that myopic borrowers overconsume relative to the rational case. The left figure plots the expected con-
sumption growth rate. The figure shows that myopic borrowers smooth consumption imperfectly. More
importantly, defaults acts as a disciplining device: As the borrower approaches default, consumption de-
clines and the expected growth rate in consumption approaches the rational benchmark.
2.3.2 Underinvestment in normal times and risk shifting in crisis times




























= ( Ψ′(c∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Effect of default
+ G′(c∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Effect of myopia: marginal shadow wealth
)× θ?. (22)
The first term, Ψ′, leads to risk shifting in crisis times (gambling for resurrection). The second term in
expression (22) shows that myopia distorts investment further. Combined with expression (19) and the
right panel of Figure 3, it becomes clear that myopia leads to underinvestment in normal times times when
wealth is high and to overinvestment relative to the rational benchmark in crisis times when wealth is low,
since G′(c) is negative for high c and G′(c) is positive for low c.
3 Optimal Bailout Fund
This section derives the optimal incentive-compatible bailout policy that minimizes intertemporal costs.
We start by characterizing the hard-default threshold W a and soft-default threshold W− and then deter-
mine bailout fund size and equilibrium bailout scheme, T (W ).
3.1 Hard vs. soft default
As discussed in Section 1, we assume for simplicity that in a hard default the borrower becomes autark and
the bailout agency seizes assets so that wealth changes from W to W a(W ) = ω0 +ω1W , with parameters
ω0, ω1 determined by the enforcability of debt. Optimal consumption in autarky is a constant fraction of
wealth, ca(W ) = ψaW , with autark consumption-wealth ratio
ψa =
ρ− (1− γ)(µ− γ σ2
2
)
γ − (1− δ)
. (23)











If a hard default (HD) is optimal, it occurs when wealth drops to the threshold W a that satisfies the
value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions (see Grenadier and Wang (2007))
VMC HD : M(W a) = Ω(W a), (25)
SPC HD : M ′(W a) = Ω′(W a). (26)
These conditions determine the hard-default threshold and the consumption policy. Appendix B shows
that the hard-default threshold depends on the ratio of the propensities to consume in autarky and good
times, ψa/ψ. Myopia increases both propensities, yet in a symmetric fashion, so that their ratio remains
independent of myopia.
Lemma 3 shows that myopia does not distort a myopic borrower’s default decision in the absence of
a bailout agency that provides optimal incentives. This benchmark result follows from the assumption
of instantaneous gratification with constant relative risk aversion. In this case, the marginal cost and
marginal benefit of default vary symmetrically with δ. Any distortions in default decisions thus arise from
the strategic interaction between borrower and bailout agency.












































In a soft default (SD), borrower and bailout agency negotiate over a financial transfer to keep the
borrower from outright default. Following Mella-Barral (1999), we model the interaction as a dynamic
game in which the borrower acts as the Stackelberg leader and the agency acts as the follower. The
borrower pleads for financial aid at the soft-default threshold W−. The agency responds by offering an
incentive-compatible transfer that changes wealth to W+ = W− + T (W−). The agency offers T (W−) to
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keep the borrower afloat, which requires an individual rationality constraint for the borrower:
IR borrower SD : M(W− + T (W−)) ≥ Ω(W− + T (W−)), (28)
withM(W ) from (14) and Ω(W ) from (24). The thresholdW− is a best response given the transfer policy
T and the history of past transfers and default thresholds. In turn, the transfer policy is a best response to
any default threshold W chosen by the borrower, given the history of past transfers and default thresholds.
We analyze a stationary subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in which W− and T (W−) are time invariant.
In a soft default, the value-matching condition requires that the borrower’s value functions are proba-
bilistically matched before and after default. The borrower optimally decides when to call on the agency’s
help. The optimality condition requires that marginal benefit and cost are equalized. With probability
0 ≤ p < 1 that negotiations fail and value Ω(W ) after a hard default, the value-matching and smooth-
pasting conditions for the soft-default threshold W− read
VMC SD : M(W−) = (1− p)M(W+) + pΩ(W−), (29)
SPC SD : M ′(W−) = (1− p)M ′(W+)(1 + T ′(W−)) + pΩ′(W−). (30)
The term T ′(W−) in condition (30) arises because the borrower is strategic in default about how transfer
T (W−) depends on the wealth level W− at which the borrower defaults.
The borrower’s default incentive thus depends on the steepness T ′ of the bailout scheme. The agency,
in turn, can design the transfer to influence the borrower’s default decision. A steeper contract with larger
T ′ induces the borrower to default later, potentially reducing the cost to the agency.
A solution to (29) and (30) does not exist for all parameter values.14 If it exists, we can verify that the
solution is an equilibrium. In turn, a hard default is an equilibrium if no threshold satisfying (29) and (30)
exists, or if bailout costs exceed the cost of hard default. Positive transfers require therefore the agency’s
14See Tan et al. (2019) for generic conditions guaranteeing that the solution to the SPC solves the Bellman system and, hence,
is an equilibrium. The authors also show that there exists no equilibrium that cannot be obtained by the SPC.
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individual rationality constraint
IR agency SD : I(c(W−)) ≤ κ+W a(W−)−W− (31)
where I(c) are the intertemporal bailout costs under SD.
3.2 Bailout fund
To determine the optimal bailout policy and bailout fund size, we need to value the agency’s payment
obligations given an incentive-compatible default threshold W− and an equilibrium bailout schedule
T = T (W−). The bailout agency minimizes the intertemporal costs, trading off infrequent large against
frequent small transfers, or not bailing out at all. Expected bailout costs I(c) are the present value of costs
conditional on default:
I(c) = I(c−)× Def(c). (32)
Upon reaching the soft-default threshold, the agency’s cost incorporate the current transfers, the cost
of future bailouts, and the possibility of a hard default:
I(c−) = (1− p)( T︸︷︷︸
Current transfer
+ I(c+)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Future bailouts
) + p(κ+W a(W−)−W−︸ ︷︷ ︸
Hard default
). (33)
Evaluating (32) at the post-transfer equilibrium consumption c+ = c(W− + T ) and substituting in (33)
yields the annuity value of transfers and hard default costs. Solving forward, one obtains
I(c) =
(1− p)T + p(κ+W a(W−)−W−)
1− (1− p)Def(c+)
× Def(c). (34)
Expression (34) expresses the required bailout funds in terms of the agency’s transfers, which is crucial
for characterizing the optimal bailout policy.
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3.3 Equilibrium bailout scheme
The optimal incentive-compatible bailout policy minimizes the intertemporal costs to the bailout agency
in (32), given that the borrower follows a threshold strategy and asks for financial aid whenever wealth
drops below the endogenous threshold W− determined by (29) and (30). A hard default is optimal if no
such threshold exists or the bailout costs exceed the cost of outright default.
We now characterize the optimal bailout, given the agency’s and the borrower’s objectives and se-
quence of moves. By the one-shot deviation principle, the optimal bailout is pinned down by deviations
from the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in a single round of bailout negotiations. The agency when
deciding its transfer policy T (W ) takes into account that the borrower changes its default policy with the
size of the offered bailout. The optimality condition for T (W ) equates the marginal benefit of the transfer
to its marginal cost. As a result, the optimal bailout policy depends on borrower myopia.
Lemma 4 Fix a soft default threshold W−. It is optimal for the bailout agency to offer a bailout T > 0 if
and only if default spillovers exceed κ = − Y
′(c−)
Def ′(c−)
− (ω0 − (1− ω1)W−).
The size of the optimal bailout, when positive, is given by the following proposition:















Condition (35) illustrates how the optimal bailout policy depends on myopia. The marginal benefit of
the transfer is the reduction in the cost of future defaults through a reduction in the risk-neutral default
probability (first term in expression (35)) times the discounted losses given default to the bailout agency
(second term in expression (35)). The marginal cost of the bailout on the right-hand side of (35) is 1.
Equilibrium consumption dynamics (20) with subsistence level c− and jump size c+ − c−, and wealth
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dynamics with soft-default threshold W− and financial transfer T (W−) = Y (c+)−W− are pinned down
by the conditions SPC: c− = (pω1)
− 1
γ ψa(ω0 + ω1W
−), VMC: N(c−) = (1 − p)N(c+) + pΩ(W−), c+:
Y ′(c+) = −∂Def(c
+)
∂c+
I(c−), with the expressions for ψa from (23), N(c) from (14), Ω(W ) from (24), Y (c)
from (12), Def(c) from (15), and I(c) from (34).
The impact of myopia on the optimal bailout depends on the sensitivity to wealth of the price of default
and on the magnitude of bailout costs. Financial transfers are less effective under myopia than rationality
at reducing the risk-neutral default probability. Therefore, the risk-neutral default probability is not only
higher but also less sensitive to wealth under myopia than rationality, and the cost of default is higher.
These forces imply that optimal financial transfers can be higher or lower under myopia than rationality.
In case financial transfers are less effective at staving off default and reducing the price of the default
claim, the claim is less sensitive to wealth under myopia than rationality. As a result, optimal transfers are
lower under myopia. On the other hand, the need for larger bailouts is higher when future bailouts arrive
sooner. Transfers are therefore higher under myopia if default is sufficiently more costly.
3.4 Tradeoff in myopia-optimal bailout
To illustrate the tradeoff inherent in the optimal bailout and its interaction with the borrower’s incentive to
default, we consider two counterfactuals. First, we fix the policy of the bailout agency and ask how does
a borrower’s default policy change with myopia? Second, we fix the default policy and ask how does the
bailout policy change with myopia?
Consider first how a borrower’s default policy changes with myopia, given the policy of the agency.
In deciding whether to default or not, the borrower balances the benefits of default (immediate increase
in wealth) against its future costs (loss of access to the risk free asset and eligibility for future bailouts).
Myopia diminishes the importance the borrower attaches to the future, either after a bailout or after a
hard default. The following result shows that myopia leaves unaffected the default policy of the borrower,
holding fixed the policy of the bailout agency. This myopia irrelevance result follows from the same
tradeoff as described in Lemma 3.
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Theorem 2 (Myopia irrelevance) Fix a transfer T that is offered by the bailout agency once the borrower
reaches a soft-default threshold W−. Then W− is invariant to the myopia parameter δ.
Consider next how the bailout policy changes with myopia, given the default policy of the borrower.
Holding fixed the default policy, the equilibrium bailout scheme has the following important property.
Proposition 3 (Target leverage) Given an equilibrium default threshold W−, there exists a target wealth
W+, so that the optimal bailout scheme has the property T ′(W ) = −1 for all W , which is independent of
the myopia parameter δ.
The result follows from the first-order condition that is independent of W :
∂I(c(W );T )
∂T





) = 0. (36)
In a soft default, if the borrower receives a bailout, one-shot deviations thus have the property that W+
and c+ = c(W+) are independent of when the borrower defaults. Alternative bailout schemes differ, as a
result, in the intercept but not the slope of the bailout schedule.
4 Default Procrastination and the Impunity of Myopia
4.1 Comparing bailouts: When does myopia get rewarded?
We now return to the question of how a bailout agency optimally adapts its policy and chooses its bailout
fund size depending on a borrower’s myopia. Below we concentrate on bailout policy, leaving aside any
structural policy aimed at strengthening the time-consistency of a borrower.
Whether myopic borrowers are treated more strictly or more leniently by bailout agencies ultimately
depends on economic determinants that affect the growth rate of the economy, the costs of a hard default,
and the risk of negotiation failure. To demonstrate the economic intuition, we show how transfers differ
between myopic (δ = 0) and rational borrowers (δ = 1) as we vary the parameters of the model. Let Θ
denote the domain of the model parameters {γ, ρ, r, ω0, ω1, p, µ, σ, κ}.
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Lemma 5 Myopia is punished (rewarded) when a myopic borrower (0 ≤ δ < 1) receives a smaller
(larger) financial transfer than a rational borrower (δ = 1). For ∆ ⊆ Θ, punishment and reward depend
on the following conditions:
1. Myopia is punished for low levels of negotiation risk p, and rewarded otherwise.
2. Myopia is punished when spillover costs κ are low, and rewarded otherwise.
3. Myopia is punished for low values of risk aversion γ, and rewarded otherwise.
4. Myopia is punished for low values of impatience ρ, and rewarded otherwise.
5. Myopia is punished when the market price of risk ν is high, and rewarded otherwise.
6. Myopia is punished when default cost ω0 is high and ω1 is low, and rewarded otherwise.
Figure 5 illustrates when myopia gets punished in equilibrium (blue region) and when it gets re-
warded (red region). The white and grey regions indicate no bailout in equilibrium. Myopia gets pun-
ished when the equilibrium transfer is smaller under myopia than under rationality, T (W−; δ ≈ 0) >
T (W−; δ = 1). Myopia gets rewarded when the equilibrium transfer is larger under myopia than under
rationality, T (W−; δ ≈ 0) < T (W−; δ = 1). We start with the base case (γ, ρ, r, ω0, ω1, p, µ, σ, κ) =
(5, 0.02, 0.015, 1, 0.5, 0.2, 0.025, 0.05, 10) and in each plot we vary two parameters. The top left figure
varies spillover cost κ and renegotiation friction p. The top right figure varies impatience ρ and risk aver-
sion γ. The bottom left figure varies volatility σ and growth rate µ. The bottom right figure varies the
recovery parameters ω0 and ω1. The plots confirm Lemma 5. Equilibrium transfers increase under myopia
relative to rationality when spillover cost κ, renegotiation frictions p, risk aversion γ, volatility σ, and
variable recovery ω1 are higher, and when impatience ρ, growth rate µ, and fixed recovery ω0 are lower.
[Figure 5 About Here.]
4.2 Procrastinated default
Default procrastination is a recurrent issue for distressed borrowers. Under what conditions does myopia
lead to early or late default, and why do myopic borrowers procrastinate default?
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Figure 6 illustrates when myopia leads to early default (red region) or late default (blue region). The
white and grey region indicate no bailout in equilibrium and, hence, a hard default occurs at W a. We
consider soft default to occur early under myopia when it occurs earlier than hard default (W− > W a).
Correspondingly, soft default occurs late under myopia when it occurs later than hard default (W− < W a).
The figure provides a simple intuition: Larger bailouts incentivize earlier default.
The question that is pertinent for policy makers concerns the interaction between bailout and default
incentive. Figure 7 illustrates how the parameters affect whether myopia leads to procrastinated soft
default (red region) or accelerated soft default (blue region). The white and grey regions indicate no bailout
in equilibrium and, hence, a hard default occurs at W a. We consider a default as procrastinated under
myopia when it occurs later than rational default (W−(δ ≈ 0) < W−(δ = 1)). Correspondingly, default
is accelerated under myopia when it occurs earlier than rational default (W−(δ ≈ 0) > W−(δ = 1)). The
figure shows that default procrastination and borrower myopia are intricately related. Myopic borrowers
tend to procrastinate default when myopia is punished. This occurs for low spillovers, low negotiation
frictions, high impatience, high growth, low volatility, high fixed and low variable default costs.
[Figures 6 and 7 About Here.]
4.3 Is rational or myopic default cheaper to resolve?
For the size of the bailout fund, it is important to know if rational or myopic default is cheaper to resolve.
Proposition 4 The bailout costs upon default, I(c−), monotonically fall with δ. The size of the bailout
fund, given by expected bailout costs I(c(W )), falls or rises with δ.























Expression (37) illustrates that competing forces determine if the expected bailout costs I(c(W )) fall or
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rise with δ. The first and last terms in the two brackets are negative, while the second and third terms are
positive. Depending on the parameters, the negative or the positive forces dominate.
Figure 8 illustrates when myopia is more expensive to resolve than rational default and when it is
cheaper to resolve. The red area indicates regions where myopic default is more expensive to resolve than
rational default, such that I(c(W−); δ ≈ 0) > I(c(W−); δ = 1). The blue area indicates regions where
myopic default is cheaper to resolve than rational default, such that I(c(W−); δ ≈ 0) < I(c(W−); δ = 1).
The figure reveals an important intuition. Myopic default tends to be cheaper to resolve when myopia is
punished, but sometimes also when myopia is rewarded.
[Figure 8 About Here.]
4.4 Does myopia harm all or benefit some?
Myopia harms a borrower through imperfect consumption smoothing. But can myopia, in fact, benefit
rational stakeholders when only the decision maker is myopic, such as citizens under a populist govern-
ment or equityholders under a myopic management? The size and frequency of bailouts depend on the
myopia of the borrower. The following result shows that the strategic impact on the bailout policy and the
endogenous timing of soft default can dominate the consumption-savings distortions.
Proposition 5 The value function R(W ) of a rational agent under a myopic borrower rises or falls with
δ. In particular, d
dδ
R(W−; δ = 1) Q 0.
The value function of a rational agent under a myopic borrower equals the value function R(W ) after





















Its total derivative with respect to δ, d
dδ
R(W ) = ∂
∂δ




c(W ), can be either positive or
negative depending on the parameters. As a result, a rational agent may benefit from myopia due to the
bailout concessions and, more importantly, the change in the endogenous timing of default.
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5 Debt Spirals and Growth Traps
The distortions that myopia imposes on consumption and investment reflect on the dynamics of wealth
in ways that have been documented empirically. As shown in the Appendix, Itô’s lemma applied on the
inverse consumption function (12) yields wealth dynamics dW = m(c)dt + ν
γ
Y ′(c)cdw, with expected
wealth growth m(c) = rY (c)− c+ ν2
γ
Y ′(c)c.
Wealth dynamics nest several distinct patterns of growth, depending on growth opportunities and bor-
rower characteristics. To characterize them, we use the following definition:
Definition 1 Wealth dynamics exhibit
i. Global growth if m(c) ≥ 0 for every c ≥ c−.
ii. A global spiral if m(c) ≤ 0 for every c ≥ c−.
iii. A local spiral if there exists c† > c− such that m(c) ≤ 0 for c ∈ [c−, c†) and m(c) ≥ 0 for
c ∈ (c†,∞).
iv. A trap if there exists c‡ > c− such that m(c) ≥ 0 for c ∈ [c−, c‡) and m(c) ≤ 0 for c ∈ (c‡,∞).
Global growth corresponds to the case in which the trend in wealth is positive for any wealth level
above the default threshold. In such an environment, default occurs due only to negative economic shocks.
Instead, default seems rather unavoidable in a global spiral, as the trend in wealth is always negative.
The special cases are local spiral and trap. A local spiral occurs when the expected growth in wealth is
positive in normal times but turns negative once wealth drops below the critical point c†, rendering default
imminent. In a trap, the expected growth pattern is reversed. Wealth growth is positive below and negative
above the critical point c‡, such that the borrower is trapped in the neighborhood of the critical point.
Lemma 6 Let m(c∗) be defined on the (0,∞) domain. Then m(·) is concave in equilibrium consumption





has at most one root in c∗ which exists if and only if K > 0 and W− ≤ W 0, where W 0 = K−1ψK c
−. In







1+γh . In addition,
m′(·) has at most one root in equilibrium consumption which exists if and only if K > 0 and W− ≤ W 1,
where W 1 =
γhKc−−(c−)1+γh
γhKψ









In the above lemma, the zero-trend consumption, c0, and the zero-marginal trend consumption, c1, are
obviously infeasible when they lie below the soft-default boundary c−. Their relative ranking is instru-
mental in ordering the wealth thresholds W 0 and W 1 that characterize the growth patterns, as shown in
the next proposition.
Proposition 6 Assume K > 0. The dynamics of wealth exhibit:
i. Local spiral if r > ν2h and W < W 1 < W 0, or r < ν
2h and W < W 0 < W 1.
ii. Trap if r > ν2h and W < W 0 < W 1, or r < ν
2h and W < W 1 < W 0.
iii. Global growth if r > ν2h and W 1 < W 0 < W , or r < ν
2h and W 0 < W 1 < W .
iv. Global spiral if r > ν2h and W 0 < W 1 < W , or r < ν
2h and W 1 < W 0 < W .
Assume K < 0. The dynamics of wealth exhibit global spiral if r > ν2h and global growth if r < ν2h.
Depending on parameter values, all of the four cases are possible. We concentrate below on the two
interesting cases from an economic perspective, local spiral and trap.
Case i. In a local debt spiral, the threat of default does not discipline the borrower. Expected wealth
growth is positive in normal times, but when the borrower crosses the critical point Y (c†), expected wealth
growth turns negative. This is illustrated in Figure 9 a)-c) which demonstrates wealth dynamics. The early
years are characterized by repeated default episodes. Default is followed by debt relief, but soon enough
the negative trend in wealth pushes the borrower back to the default boundary. The density of the distance-
to-default Wt −W− in Figure 9 c) peaks at low levels, indicating prolonged crisis. The dotted black line
in Figure 9 a) shows the distance to default for which the trend in wealth becomes zero. In the vicinity of
that distance, expected growth fluctuates between positive and negative levels according to random shock
realizations. The red bar marks the last time in the graph for which the borrower crosses the zero-trend
threshold. Ultimately, the borrower enters a prolonged period of positive expected growth.15
15In the spirit of Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), these growth dynamics can be interpreted as “graduation” to an advanced level,
away from the default region.
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Case ii. A trap reflects an economic environment in which wealth exhibits positive expected growth
in the vicinity of default (Figure 9 d)-f)). However, as wealth grows beyond the critical point Y (c‡),
the trend in wealth turns negative so that wealth returns to the positive trend territory, thus producing
economic stagnation. Early growth is followed by a prolonged period in which wealth fluctuates around
a constant steady-state level. The borrower stays in the vicinity of default. This implies that even if there
is a prolonged period for which no default happens, the value of the default option remains an important
determinant in the consumption and investment decisions of the borrower.
Myopia renders the trap more likely. The value of the default option reduces both the marginal utility
of continuation and risk aversion, thus inducing both higher consumption and investment. In a local spiral,
the consumption effect dominates close to default, whereas in a trap the investment effect dominates and
more so under myopia. The result are vastly different patterns in wealth growth and crisis duration.
[Figure 9 About Here.]
6 Credit Spread Dynamics
The time-inconsistency of consumption and risk-taking policies under myopia renders standard market-
based credit metrics unsuitable proxies for default risk. For sovereigns, Tomz and Wright (2013) document
that credit spreads are highly nonlinear and excessively sensitive to fundamentals. These features arise in
our setting as natural characteristics of credit risk dynamics.
In the standard Merton (1974) and Black and Cox (1976) settings, the price of a derivative claim has
a power shape, exactly like MDef(c), such that on a log-log scale it increases linearly as the distance to
default declines. The market price of a default-contingent derivative claim, Def(c), has, by contrast, a
mixed power-hypergeometric shape in our setting:












The mixed power-hypergeometric function has a distinctive shape. For low default probability, it is
less convex than the power function and plots concave in the distance to default on a log-log scale. Hence,
the default claim is very sensitive to small changes in the likelihood of default for high distance to default.
There exists a critical point, however, where the relation switches. For high default probability, the mixed
power-hypergeometric function is more convex than the power function and plots convex in the distance
to default on a log-log scale. This means the price of the derivative claim rises at an accelerating rate as
the distance to default declines.
Figure 10 illustrates the relation between default probability and the price of a default-contingent claim
when the borrower is myopic. The left figure plots the price of a default-contingent claim, Def(c), as a
function of the distance-to-default. The blue line assumes that the borrower is rational (δ = 1). The red
line assumes that the borrower is myopic (δ ≈ 0). The right figure plots the price of a default-contingent
claim, Def(c), against the private valuation by a myopic borrower of a state-contingent claim that pays one
unit when default occurs, MDef(c). The blue line assumes that the borrower is rational (δ = 1). The red
line assumes that the borrower is myopic (δ ≈ 0).
[Figure 10 About Here.]
7 Extension: Inadequate Bailout Funds and Risky Debt
The analysis so far assumes that the agency’s bailout fund suffices to reimburse creditors in full, which
requires a fund size Wα(W−) −W− in case of a hard default. We now relax this assumption by allow-
ing creditors to suffer losses upon default. Below we provide the economic setup and discuss the main
economic conclusions, while relegating all proofs to the Internet Appendix.
To model debt dynamics as the borrower approaches default, we will retain the assumption of contin-
uously adjusted debt. However, we modify the debt issuance technology as follows: Each bond issued
pays one unit upon maturity and zero otherwise, provided the borrower does not default on its obligations.
Each of the bonds has an exogenous random maturity which arrives at Poisson rate m. Maturity events
are independently distributed across bonds so that, at each instant, fraction m of existing bonds matures.
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Newly issued bonds that have not matured receive a take-it-or-leave-it repurchase offer by the borrower.
The offer equals the market price of the bond since investors are competitive. Non-tendering bondholders
do not receive a further offer in the future, which implies that they bear the credit risk of the bond.
The borrower retains a fraction ω1 of the risky investment and repays an equal fraction ω1 of the debt
due in a hard default at wealth threshold W− < 0.16 In addition, creditors seize fraction ω0 of the risky
investment lost to the borrower. The recovered value is distributed among creditors in a pari-passu fashion.
The bailout agency suffers spillover cost that are affine in the change in gross wealth of the borrower upon
hard default with intercept κ0 and slope parameter κ1. Finally, the borrower enjoys constant endowment
flow e in normal times which is reduced to e× (1− φ) after a hard default, for φ ∈ (0, 1).
In such an event, the creditors’ total recovery equals to
R = −ω1(1− θ(c−))(W− + e) + ω0(1− ω1)θ(c−)(W− + e). (41)
The first term in R is the part of recovery related to the amount of debt outstanding and the second is the
recovery from the risky investment. Given this economic environment, we can characterize bond prices as
a function of equilibrium consumption.











where D(c−) and Pm(c) are respectively the bond value at the default boundary and the price of a claim
that pays 1 upon default and zero otherwise, both given in the Internet Appendix.
Investment in the risky asset incorporates a hedging demand against bond price movements, whenever
there is debt outstanding:
θ∗(c) = − R
′(W )






16The equality between the fraction of risky assets retained and the fraction of debt repaid simplifies the autarky value for
the borrower. Other than that, this assumption plays no economic role in the model.
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where µD(c) and σD(c) are respectively the expected return and volatility of the bond given in the Internet






−W− − e)( c
c−
)−γh.
Figure 11 compares the bond value for a myopic versus a time-consistent borrower as a function of
wealth. In both cases bond values converge to their risk free value as wealth tends to infinity which lies
above the value at the soft-default boundary. In the example shown, myopia leads to procrastination of
default which implies that the bond values of the myopic borrower lie above that of a rational borrower.
The volatility of bond prices increases closer to default, since bond prices become more sensitive to wealth
shocks. As a result, the hedging demand component in the risky investment share ratio increases. Intu-
itively, the borrower hedges against adverse bond price movements by increasing investment in the risky
asset. This gives rise to the possibility of both debt values and investment rising closer to default. This
behavior resembles a debt-financed investment spree prior to default.
[Figure 11 About Here.]
To assess the implications of a hard default, on wealth notice first that the investment share θ and
consumption c have continuous time paths for any W > W−. The value of the risky investment at the
default threshold is lim
c↓c−
θ(c)(W+e) = θ(c−)(W−+e), and debt issued stands at lim
c↓c−
−(1−θ(c))(W+e) =
−(1 − θ(c−))(W− + e). The borrower repays a fraction ω1 of the debt, loses a fraction (1 − ω1) of the
risky asset investment, and receives an endowment reduced by bankruptcy costs, e(1 − φ), so that gross
wealth equals
W a(W−) = W− + e︸ ︷︷ ︸
value after last investment
+ (1− ω1)(θ(c−)− 1)(W− + e)︸ ︷︷ ︸
debt relief
− (1− ω1)θ(c−)(W− + e)︸ ︷︷ ︸
risky assets lost
+ (1− φ)e︸ ︷︷ ︸
post-default endowment
, (44)
which rewrites compactly as W a(W−) = ω1(W− + e) + (1− φ)e.
The cost of the agency at the default boundary is still affine in W−. Upon reaching the soft-default
threshold, the agency’s cost incorporate current transfers, the cost of future bailouts, and the possibility of
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a hard default:
I(c−) = (1− p)(T + I(c+)) + p(κ0 + κ1(W a(W−)− (W− + e))) (45)
The pricing of an infinite maturity default claim that pays one unit upon soft default continues to be
given by (15), consumption dynamics still follows equation (20), and the intertemporal cost of the bailout
agency away from default is still characterized by (32). As a result, any positive transfer still obeys (35),
and the contract is given by the same conditions with consumption at the soft boundary modified to account
for the endowment: c− = (pω1)
− 1
γ ψa((1− φ+ ω1)e+ ω1W−).
As a result, the implications of myopia for optimal bailout design of Section 4 extend in an analogous
fashion to the case of risky debt.
8 Conclusion
Since debt crises have become a recurrent phenomenon, notwithstanding the fact that the recent surge
in global debt has been due to a pandemic, this paper explores the impact of time-inconsistent borrower
preferences on debt crisis dynamics and optimal crisis resolution in a continuous-time model of strategic
defaults and repeated bailouts.
The threat of default creates a retractive force that, like a rubber band, pulls time-inconsistent bor-
rowers back into distress and inflicts serial default. Myopic borrowers, as a result, imperfectly smooth
consumption by overconsuming more in good times than in bad times. At the core of this effect is that
myopic borrowers endogenously misprice their option to default by a U-shaped negative pricing error. The
default mispricing distorts the borrower’s timing of default and affects the lenders’ optimal bailout policy.
Bailout agencies face a tradeoff to either punish or reward borrower myopia through smaller or, re-
spectively, larger financial transfers. Smaller transfers lead to more procrastinated default and protracted
crises. We show that the equilibrium transfer schedule differs across more or less myopic borrowers in its
intercept, but myopia is irrelevant for its curvature. Optimal bailouts punish or reward myopia depending
on whether transfers exacerbate or alleviate the borrowers’ misperception of default risk.
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The model captures the sequence of events during the European debt crisis in which the ECB, EFSF,
ESM, and IMF were involved in the bailout of Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Greece, Cyprus, Latvia, Romania,
and Hungary. The varying degree of duration, size, and success of these programs have stirred policy de-
bates regarding their appropriate design. Our model shows that some borrowers optimally receive larger
bailouts to resolve a debt crisis quickly (“southern view”) while others receive a series of smaller bailouts
to discipline borrower behavior (“northern view”). We also show to what extent bailing out myopic bor-
rowers can be cheaper than bailing out rational borrowers, and why populist behavior can be a bargaining
chip to extract higher financial transfers.
The restrictions on economic activity due to the Covid-19 pandemic have inevitably lead to a surge
in debt, parts of which will need to be renegotiated. Bailout agencies can use our analysis to guide their
considerations towards the design of Covid-19 related bailout schemes.
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Appendix A Derivations in Sections 1 and 2
Value functions N(c) and M(W ): After plugging in optimal consumption c∗ and investment θ∗ that maximize (4),
ρM(W ) = δu(c∗) +M ′(W )[W (r + θ∗(µ− r))− c∗] + σ
2
2




− 1)M ′(W )1−
1






The ODE for Y (c) obtains as follows. We have Y ′(c∗(W ))∂c
∗(W )




2 +Y ′(c∗(W ))∂
2c∗(W )





Y ′(c∗(W )) and
∂2c∗(W )
(∂W )2 = −
Y ′′(c∗(W ))
Y ′(c∗(W ))3 . Differentiating both sides of (7) with respect to W yields




























Differentiating both sides and rearranging yields





































Y ′(c)N ′′(c)− Y ′′(c)N ′(c)
)
. (A5)
The value functions N(c) and M(W ) can now be solved for, where we use that cY ′(c) = cψ − γh(Y (c)−
c
ψ ).
Proof of Lemma 2: Let J(W ) = M(W )− δR(W ). Index the optimal consumption policy and the investment share by
λ, to read as c∗λ(W ) and θ
∗
λ(W ), respectively. Multiply both sides of (5) by δ and subtract from (4) to obtain
(ρ+ λ)J(W ) = (1− δ)u(c∗λ(W )) + J ′(W ) [W (r + θ
∗
λ(W )(µ− r))− c∗λ(W )] +
1
2
J ′′(W )W 2(θ∗λ(W )σ)
2
From the Feynman-Kac formula:





where W0 = W and the budget dynamics (1) hold with c = c∗λ(W ) and θ = θ
∗
λ(W ).
If γ ∈ (1/2, 1):












































































Taking limits on both sides as λ→∞ and noticing that R̃(W, γ̃) is invariant to λ, lim
λ→∞
J(W ) = 0.
If γ > 1:
First notice that J(W ) ≤ 0. Defining as Tλ the stopping time of hard default, we have







u′(c) = −∞ for γ > 1, there exists a strictly positive lower bound for consumption, i.e. c∗λ(W ) ≥ c∗λ > 0 for
every W ≥W and lim
λ→∞










Taking limits on both sides as λ→∞, lim
λ→∞
J(W ) = 0.
If γ = 1:
Then u(c) = log(c) ≤ c
1−γ
1−γ for γ ∈ (0, 1). For this reason, E
∫∞
0






















q̂ = 1 and γ = 1− q̂(1− γ)
γ = 2γ − 1.
Following the analysis of the case γ > 1 above,










As before, we conclude lim
λ→∞
J(W ) = 0.
Finally, multiplying (5) by δ, subtracting from (4) and taking the limit as λ→∞ we have
lim
λ→∞
E(W ) + (1− δ)u(c∗λ(W )) = 0.
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Shadow wealth: Consider how a rational borrower would value a claim on equilibrium consumption up until default,
denoted by Ψ(c). The no-arbitrage condition
rΨ(c) = c+
(

















with boundary conditions Ψ(c−) = W− and limc→∞Ψ(c)/c = 1/ψ has two solutions. The solution that imposes Ψ′(c) =
Y ′(c) for all c yields the subjective wealth equation (12). This can be seen from a comparison between (10) and (A6). The
ODE (10) is a special case of (A6) when Ψ′(c) = Y ′(c). The general solution that does not impose this restrictive, myopic
condition yields the market value of a consumption claim.
Appendix B Hard Default
After a hard default, there is autarky with no risk-free lending and savings technology. Then the value function in autarky,
Ω(W ), satisfies
ρΩ(W ) = δu(ca) + Ω′(W )(Wµ− ca) + σ
2
2
W 2Ω′′(W ), (B1)
with u′(ca) = Ω′(W ) and ca = ca(W ) is consumption in autarky. The ODE becomes




γ + Ω′(W )Wµ+
σ2
2
W 2Ω′′(W ), (B2)
which yields




with the autarky consumption-wealth ratio ψa is equal to
ψa =
ρ− (1− γ)(µ− γ σ
2
2 )
γ − (1− δ)
. (B4)
The smooth-pasting condition (26) can be written as u′(c−a) = Ω′(W−a), or
c−a = (ω1)
− 1γ ψa(ω0 + ω1W
−a). (B5)



























Substituting (B5) in (B6) and solving the value-matching condition (25) for the hard default threshold we obtain expression
(27) for W−a which is independent of δ and proves Lemma 3.
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Appendix C Valuing Default Claim and Cost of Bailout I(c)
The price P (c) of any default-contingent claim with payoff linked to consumption c and limc→∞ P (c) = 0, assuming complete
markets, satisfies the no-arbitrage condition
rP (c) =
(

















We conjecture that the general solution to equation (C1) is additively linear in compound functions of the form
P (c) = Ac−γiH(c), (C2)










i− r = 0, (C3)
and H(c) is a hypergeometric function. We have
P ′(c) = −γiAc−γiH(c)/c+Ac−γiH ′(c),















































We make the change of variables









and let H(c) = G(z), H ′(c) = G′(z)z′(c), H ′′(c) = G′′(z)z′(c)2 +G′(z)z′′(c), with z(c) = 1−ψY ′(c) = −ψBc−γh/c and











































































2G′′(z)z(1− z) (by (C3))
⇔ (1− δ)ψiG(z)−
[
r − ρ− (1 + 2i+ h+ 1γ )
ν2
2 − (1− δ)ψ −
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G′(z) +G′′(z)z(1− z) = 0.
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We obtain the hypergeometric differential equation for G(z):
− α1α2G(z) + [α3 − (α1 + α2 + 1) z]G′(z) +G′′(z)z(1− z) = 0. (C5)
The differential equation for G(z) is of hypergeometric form and has the solution G(z) = 2F1(α1, α2;α3; z) = (1 − z)−α1
2F1(α1, α3 − α2;α3; zz−1 ). The second equality follows from the Pfaff transformation of the hypergeometric function and
guarantees that zz−1 ∈ [0, 1]. The coefficients α1, α2,α3 are the roots to the characteristic equations
α3 =
r


















α1 + α2 = −













r − ρ− ν
2
2 − (1− δ)ψ
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r − ρ− ν22 − (1− δ)ψ
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+ 2rν2 − (1− δ)ψ −
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r − ρ− ν22 − (1− δ)ψ
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+ 2rν2 − (1− δ)ψ +
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To obtain the constant A for the default cost I(c), we use that
I(c−) = A(c−)−γiH(c−),
I(c+) = A(c+)−γiH(c+),
I(c−) = (1− p)(T (W−) + I(c+)) + p(κ+W a(W−)−W−).
Plugging in, we obtain
A =
(1− p)T (W−) + p(κ+W a(W−)−W−)
(c−)−γiH(c−)− (1− p)(c+)−γiH(c+)
. (C7)
Appendix D Proof of Proposition 4
Assume that κ > κ and that is optimal for the bailout agency to offer T = 0 . We will show that there is a one-shot deviation




J(c+) ≡ ((1− p)
[
Y (c+)−W− + Def(c+)
(




κ+ ω0 − (1− ω1)W−
)
(D1)
The first term is the discounted value of the agency’s costs, when it extends an offer T = Y (c+) −W− once and commits to
T = 0 in future pleads by the borrower, which leads to a hard default. The second term shows the cost of hard default in case




J ′(c+) = (1−p)
[
Y ′(c−) + Def ′(c−)
(




Y ′(c−) + Def ′(c−)
(




which contradicts the fact that T = 0 is optimal.
Instead, assume now that κ ≤ κ and that the agency’s optimal offer is T > 0. The present value of the agency’s costs at
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the optimal transfer satisfies






κ+ ω0 − (1− ω1)W−
)
⇔ I(c−) =
(1− p)T + p
(




For T to be optimal, the agency must prefer to offer T than make no offer at all:
I(c−)−
(
κ+ ω0 − (1− ω1)W−
)
≤ 0
⇔ Y (c+)−W− + Def(c+)
(




κ+ ω0 − (1− ω1)W−
)
. (D4)
That means the agency must prefer to offer T > 0 once than to offer zero transfer always. However, for κ < κ the agency
prefers to offer zero than to offer T > 0 once, therefore T > 0 is not optimal.
Appendix E Optimal Bailout Scheme
First, any bailout offer T > 0 that makes the borrower indifferent between defaulting and not, i.e. M(W + T ) = Ω(W + T ) is
dominated by an offer T + ε for some ε > 0, so that the borrower does not ask for a new transfer immediately upon receiving
T . Therefore the restriction M(W + T ) ≥ Ω(W + T ) holds as a strict inequality and the associated Lagrange multiplier in the
agency’s cost minimization problem is zero. Second, by the one-shot deviation principle, the optimum in the bailout agency’s
problem is pinned down by considering deviations from the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium in a single round of bailout
negotiations, reverting to the equilibrium afterwards. In particular, assume that the borrower pleads for aid when its wealth
reaches W , retaining threshold W for all future soft default events.
The bailout agency minimizes
I(c(W )) = (1− p)(T + I(c(W + T )) + p(κ+W a(W )−W ) (E1)
Since in the future both the borrower and the agency will stick to the equilibrium,
I(c(W + T ) = Def(c(W + T ))I(c−). (E2)



















I(c−) = 0 (E4)
The above condition shows that the target consumption level c+ and, hence, the target wealth level W+ = W + T are
independent of W . In equilibrium, c+ = c+ and W+ = W+, so that the contract curve offered by the bailout agency has the
property T ′(W ) = −1 for all W .
From the SPC, M ′(W−) = u′(c−) = pΩ′(W−) = pω1(ψa)−γ(ω0 + ω1W−)−γ , the lower consumption threshold is
c− = (pω1)
− 1γ ca(W−) = (pω1)
− 1γ ψa(ω0 + ω1W
−), (E5)




ψa − ω0). Therefore, whenever a positive bailout is offered by the agency, it satisfies the
agency’s optimality condition, the borrower’s smooth-pasting condition, and the value-matching condition.
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Appendix F Proof of Theorem 2

















∂M(W− + T )
∂δ





























Substituting in (F1) the smooth-pasting condition (30),
1
ρ






From (E5) and (24)
(γ − (1− δ))u(c−) = γ − (1− δ)ψα(pω1)
γ−1
γ Ω(W−) = (γ − (1− δ))γ Λu(Wα(W−)), (F3)






Solving (F2) for c−,
u′(c−) = ((1− γ)u(c−))−
γ
1−γ = (γ − (1− δ))γ ((1− γ)Λu(Wα(W−)))−
γ
1−γ (F4)
Substituting (F3) in (F2) and rearranging,

















γ − (1− δ)
[











γ − (1− δ)
)1−γ
Ku(Wα(W−))
⇒(1− p)(γ − (1− δ))u(c+) = (γ − (1− δ))γ Ku(Wα(W−)), (F5)
where K =
[










Solving (F5) for c+,
u′(c+) = ((1− γ)u(c+))−
γ















−1/γ ρ− (1− γ)(µ− γ
σ2
2 )






























Evaluating the myopic value function at W = W−, substituting (F3) and (F4), and factoring out (γ − (1− δ))γ ,
ρM(W−) = (γ − (1− δ))γ
[




















Evaluating the myopic value function at W = W− + T ,
ρ(1− p)M(W− + T ) =
(γ − (1− δ))γ
[
























Rewrite the borrower’s value in autarky as




Divide the value-matching condition (29) by (γ − (1− δ))γ and substitute (F3), (F4), (F5) and (F6):




















































ψ are both invariant to δ. Therefore (F12) is an expression invariant to δ which shows that W
−
does not change with δ given T .
Appendix G Characterizing wealth dynamics
Wealth dynamics are given by
dWt = [Wt(r + θt(µ− r))− ct]dt+ σWtθtdwt
















Proof of Lemma 6: From m(c) = rY (c) − (1 − ν2γ Y ′(c))c we have m′(c) = (r + ν
2
γ )Y

































. Therefore the sign of m′′(·) is that of ν2h − r. Since m(·) is globally concave or convex, m′(·)





































. Therefore if K < 0, m(c) < 0, m′(c) > 0 whenever r > ν2h and
m(c) > 0, m′(c) < 0 whenever r > ν2h. If K > 0 then m(c) = 0 yields c0 as the unique root and m′(c) = 0 yields c1 as the
unique root.
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Proof of Proposition 6: The cases corresponding to K < 0 and are shown in the proof of Lemma 6. If K > 0, we can
easily show that the following equivalences hold:
i. c0 > c1 ⇔ c− < (γh)
1
γh
ii. c0 > c− ⇔W− < K−1ψK c
− = W 0
iii. c1 > c− ⇔W− < γhKc
−−(c−)1+γh
γhKψ = W 1
iv. c0 > c1 ⇔W 0 < W 1
Consider the ordering of W 0,W 1,W
−. The case W 1 < W
− < W 0 is impossible since it implies c
− < c0 < c1 < c
−.
The case W 0 < W
− < W 1 is also impossible since it implies c
− < c1 < c0 < c
−.
With respect to the remaining possibilities
a) if W− < W 0 < W 1 then c
− < c1 < c0. If r > ν2h, m′(c) ≥ 0 iff c ≤ c1, which implies m′(c0) < 0. Since c0 is the
unique root of m(.), m(c) ≥ 0 iff c ≤ c0 which implies a trap. Symmetrically, if r < ν2h, m′(c) ≥ 0 iff c ≥ c1, which
implies m′(c0) > 0 and m(c) ≥ 0 iff c ≥ c0 which implies a local spiral.
b) if W 0 < W 1 < W
− then c1 < c0 < c−. If r > ν2h then m′(c) < 0 and m(c) ≤ m(c−) ≤ m(c0) = 0 for every
c ≥ c− which implies a global spiral. Symmetrically, if r < ν2h then m′(c) > 0 and m(c) ≥ m(c−) ≥ m(c0) = 0 for
every c ≥ c− which implies global growth.
c) if W− < W 1 < W 0 then c
− < c0 < c1. If r > ν2h then m′(c) ≥ 0 iff c≤c1,which implies m′(c0) > 0. Since c0is
the unique root of m(.), m(c0) ≥ 0 iff c ≥ c0 which implies a local spiral. If r < ν2h then m′(c) ≥ 0 iff c≥c1,which
implies m′(c0) < 0. Since c0is the unique root of m(.), m(c0) ≥ 0 iff c ≤ c0 which implies a trap.
d) if W 1 < W 0 < W
− then c0 < c1 < c−. If r > ν2h then m′(c0) ≤ m′(c1) = 0 which means m(.) is positive in
the right neighborhood of c0. Since c0 is the unique root of m(.), m(c) ≥ m(c0) = 0 for every c ≥ c0, which implies
global growth in the domain (c−,∞).
Collecting cases a)-d) we have the results i)-iv) of the proposition.
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Figure 5: Is myopia punished or rewarded? The figure documents when myopia gets punished in
equilibrium (blue region) and when it gets rewarded (red region). The white and grey region indicate no
bailout in equilibrium. Myopia gets punished when the equilibrium transfer is smaller under myopia than
under rationality, T (W−; δ ≈ 0) < T (W−; δ = 1). Myopia gets rewarded when the equilibrium transfer
is larger under myopia than under rationality, T (W−; δ ≈ 0) > T (W−; δ = 1). We start with the base
case (γ, ρ, r, ω0, ω1, p, µ, σ, κ) = (5, 0.02, 0.015, 1, 0.5, 0.2, 0.025, 0.05, 10), and in each plot we vary two
parameters. The top left figure varies spillover cost κ and renegotiation friction p. The top right figure
varies impatience ρ and risk aversion γ. The bottom left figure varies volatility σ and growth rate µ. The
bottom right figure varies the recovery parameters ω0 and ω1.
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Figure 6: Does myopia lead to early or late default? The figure documents when myopia leads to early
default (red region) and when it leads to late default (blue region). The white and grey region indicate no
bailout in equilibrium and, hence, a hard default occurs at W a. Soft default occurs early under myopia
when it occurs earlier than hard default (W− > W a). Soft default occurs late under myopia when it
occurs later than hard default (W− < W a). We start with the base case (γ, ρ, r, ω0, ω1, p, µ, σ, κ) =
(5, 0.02, 0.015, 1, 0.5, 0.2, 0.025, 0.05, 10), and in each plot we vary two parameters. The top left figure
varies spillover cost κ and renegotiation friction p. The top right figure varies impatience ρ and risk
aversion γ. The bottom left figure varies volatility σ and growth rate µ. The bottom right figure varies the
recovery parameters ω0 and ω1.
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Figure 7: When does myopia lead to procrastinated default? The figure documents when myopia leads
to procrastinated soft default (blue region) and when it leads to accelerated soft default (red region). The
white and grey region indicate no bailout in equilibrium and, hence, a hard default occurs at W a. Default
is procrastinated under myopia when it occurs later than rational default (W−(δ ≈ 0) < W−(δ = 1)).
Default is accelerated under myopia when it occurs earlier than rational default (W−(δ ≈ 0) > W−(δ =
1)). We start with the base case (γ, ρ, r, ω0, ω1, p, µ, σ, κ) = (5, 0.02, 0.015, 1, 0.5, 0.2, 0.025, 0.05, 10),
and in each plot we vary two parameters. The top left figure varies spillover cost κ and renegotiation
friction p. The top right figure varies impatience ρ and risk aversion γ. The bottom left figure varies
volatility σ and growth rate µ. The bottom right figure varies the recovery parameters ω0 and ω1.
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Figure 8: Is rational or myopic default cheaper to resolve? The figure documents when myopia is more
expensive to resolve than rational default (red region) and when it is cheaper to resolve (blue region).
Myopia is more expensive to resolve than rational default when I(c(W−); δ ≈ 0) > I(c(W−); δ = 1).
Myopia is cheaper to resolve than rational default when I(c(W−); δ ≈ 0) < I(c(W−); δ = 1). We start
with the base case (γ, ρ, r, ω0, ω1, p, µ, σ, κ) = (5, 0.02, 0.015, 1, 0.5, 0.2, 0.025, 0.05, 10), and in each plot
we vary two parameters. The top left figure varies spillover cost κ and renegotiation friction p. The top
right figure varies impatience ρ and risk aversion γ. The bottom left figure varies volatility σ and growth
rate µ. The bottom right figure varies the recovery parameters ω0 and ω1.
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b) Trend in wealth













c) Density of distance-to-default







e) Trend in wealth














f) Density of distance-to-default
Figure 9: Local spiral vs. trap. Plots a)-c) in the left column correspond to the case of a local spiral. Plot
a) shows a sample path of the distance-to-defaultWt−W−. The dotted black line is the distance to default
for which the trend in wealth is zero. The dotted red line shows the time of graduation, i.e. the last time in
which wealth crosses the level for which the trend in wealth is zero. Plot b) shows the trend in wealth as
a function of the distance-to-default. Plot c) shows the density of the distance to default corresponding to
the path shown in plot a). Plots d)-f) show the corresponding plots for the case of a global trap. Paths in























Figure 10: Credit spread dynamics and credit risk metrics. The left figure shows the price of a default-
contingent claim, Def(c), as a function of the distance-to-default. The blue line assumes that the borrower
is rational (δ = 1). The red line assumes that the borrower is myopic (δ ≈ 0). The right figure plots
the price of a default-contingent claim, Def(c), against the private valuation by a myopic borrower of a
state-contingent claim that pays one unit when default occurs, MDef(c). The blue line assumes that the
borrower is rational (δ = 1). The red line assumes that the borrower is myopic (δ ≈ 0).
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Figure 11: Risky debt. This figure shows bond prices D(W ), the sensitivity of bond prices to wealth
D′(W ), the volatility of bond returns σD, the investment in the risky asset θ(W + e), debt issuance
−(1 − θ)(W + e) and the level of consumption c as a function of wealth. The blue line corresponds to
a patient rational borrower (δ = 1). The red line corresponds to a myopic borrower (δ ≈ 0). The dotted
black lines in the investment figure ignore the hedging demand for the risky asset, setting σD = 0. The
dotted black lines in the consumption figure ignore the value of default option and set c = ψ(W + e).
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Internet Appendix
This Internet Appendix extends the model with risky long-term debt.
Assumptions in the model with risky debt: Let the Itô process for the value of the bond be
dD
D
= µDdt+ σDdt, (IA1)
where µD and σD are the expected capital gains and volatility of the bond contingent on the wealth of
the borrower. When there is debt outstanding, we can characterize the bond pricing equation in terms of
equilibrium consumption c = c∗(W ) by:





where µc(c) and σc(c) are, respectively, the expected value and volatility of equilibrium consumption







D(c−) = (1− p)D(c+) + p R
Π(c−)
, (IA4)
The first boundary condition regulates the value of the bond as default becomes extremely unlikely. Recall
that the borrower repurchases non-maturing bonds at market price. Non-tendering bondholders realize
that the market price of the bond will stay below the riskless value m
m+r
even in future states when the
borrower will become a saver (θ < 1). The reason is that the bond matures at a random future instant
and default arrives before maturity with positive probability. The second boundary condition specifies the
bond value at the soft-default boundary, c− = c∗(W−). In that case, if the borrower ends up in autarky, the
creditors’ total recovery is R, which is distributed equally among each of the bonds outstanding, whose
number totals to




The value of the bond at the soft-default boundary reflects the possibility of a bailout, in which case
consumption increases to c+ = c∗(W− + T (W−)).
Budget dynamics: The borrower’s wealth equals the sum of the risky investment and the bond, with
negative positions in the bond representing debt issuance. Two cases arise: The first is when the borrower
has savings in the risk-free bond, and the second captures the case with debt issuance.
Lemma 7 For any W > W−, the wealth dynamics of the borrower are given by
dW = (W + e)(r + θ(µ− r))dt+ (W + e)θσdw − cdt, if (W + e)(1− θ) > 0, (IA6)
dW = (W + e)(µD + θ(µ− µD))dt+ (W + e)(σD + θ(σ − σD))dw − cdt, otherwise, (IA7)
where µD = m(1/Dt − 1) + µD is the expected return on the bond.
1
Proof. Wealth dynamics in case (Wt + e)(1− θt) > 0 are standard. In case (Wt + e)(1− θt) < 0 there is
borrowing with risky debt. We derive the wealth dynamics by first considering the discrete time case and
then taking the limit as the length of the discrete time period h shrinks to zero. The derivation proceeds
in similar steps as for the case when borrowing is not risky. Let A be the value of investment in the risky
asset, Π the number of bonds outstanding at the start of the period, D be the price of new bonds issued, B
the value of all bonds outstanding and Πt be the number of bonds outstanding at the end of period t before
the purchase of new bonds.
Since bonds mature at rate m,
Πt = Πt−hexp(−mh). (IA8)
Wealth and endowment are spent on investment in the risky asset and bonds
Wt + e = At +Bt = At + ΠtDt. (IA9)




Xt − At + (Πt−h − Πt) + (Πt − Πt)Dt. (IA10)
On the right-hand side, the first term is the value of the investment in the risky asset, as of date t. The
second term is the new investment in the risky asset. The term in the parenthesis that follows is the payoff
































= (Wt + et)(µD + θt(µ− µD))dt+ (Wt + et)(σD + θ(σ − σD))dw − ctdt.
Instantaneous gratification with risky debt: The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations in case
of debt issuance (θ∗ > 1) for M(W ) and, respectively, R(W ) at any wealth level W above the default
2
threshold W− are given by17:
ρM(W )− E(W ) = max
c,θ




M ′′(W )(W + e)2(σD(c) + θ(σ − σD(c)))2, (IA11)
ρR(W ) = u(c∗) +R′(W )[(W + e)(µD(c




R′′(W )(W + e)2(σD(c
∗) + θ∗(σ − σD(c∗)))2. (IA12)
Lemma 8 Fix a default threshold W and let the value of the borrower upon entering hard default be
Ω(W,λ). Furthermore, assume there exists a finite limit Ω(W ) such that lim
λ→∞
Ω(W,λ) = Ω(W ). Then
lim
λ→∞
M(W )− δR(W ) = 0 and lim
λ→∞
E(W ) + (1− δ)u(c∗(W )) = 0.
Proof.
Let J(W ) = M(W )− δR(W ). Index the optimal consumption policy and the investment share by λ,
to read as c∗λ(W ) and θ
∗
λ(W ) respectively. Multiply both sides of (IA12) by δ and subtract from (IA11) to
obtain




J ′′(W )(W + e)2(σD + θ
∗
λ(W )(σ − σD))2.
From the Feynman-Kac formula:





where W0 = W and the budget dynamics of Lemma (10) hold with c = c∗λ(W ) and θ = θ
∗
λ(W ).
If γ ∈ (1/2, 1):
Select q ∈ (1, 1
















































































Taking limits on both sides as λ→∞ and noticing that R̃(W, γ̃) is invariant to λ, lim
λ→∞
J(W ) = 0.
If γ > 1:
First notice that J(W ) ≤ 0.
Defining as Tλ the stopping time of hard default, we have







u′(c) = −∞ for γ > 1, there exists a strictly positive lower bound for consumption, i.e.
c∗λ(W ) ≥ c∗λ > 0 for every W ≥ W and lim
λ→∞
c∗λ > 0.










Taking limits on both sides as λ→∞, lim
λ→∞
J(W ) = 0.
If γ = 1:
Then u(c) = log(c) ≤ c
1−γ
1−γ for γ ∈ (0, 1).
For this reason, E
∫∞
0

























= 1 and γ = 1− q̂(1− γ).
γ = 2γ − 1.
Following the analysis of the case γ > 1 above,










As before, we conclude lim
λ→∞
J(W ) = 0.
Finally, multiplying (IA12) by δ, subtracting from (IA11) and taking the limit as λ→∞ we have
lim
λ→∞
E(W ) + (1− δ)u(c∗λ(W )) = 0.
Wealth and consumption dynamics:






































Proof. Wealth dynamics with θ = θ∗(W ) and c = c∗(W ) are given by (IA13) since








(Y (ct) + e).
Expected return and volatility of risky bonds: The expected return and volatility of the bond are given
by a no-arbitrage argument.

































µD = µD +m(
1
D(c)
− 1) = r + νσc(c)
D′(c)c
D(c)
= r + νσD(c).





















which is solved subject to the boundary conditions Pm(c−) = 1 and lim
c→∞
Pm(c) = 0.
This is the same problem as the default claim pricing problem of section 2, with the exception that the




















x− r −m, (IA16)
and







β1 + β2 = −































Hm is the same 2F1 function as Hm with β’s evaluated at j. This conjugate solution diverges and does not
satisfy the boundary condition lim
c→∞
Pm(c) = 0.
To solve the debt boundary value problem first notice that the function D(c)− m
m+r
satisfies the default
pricing equation (IA15). By the superposition principle, there exists coefficients κ1, κ2 such that
D(c)− m
m+ r






= 0 and Pm(c) diverges, we have κ2 = 0. Solving for the boundary condition at
































−p(1− ω1)(1− θ(c−))− pω0(1− ω1)θ(c−)














and σ2 = ω0σ1. Furthermore,
θ(c−) =
Y ′(c−)









(σ − σ1 − σ2
θ(c−)
(1− θ(c−))
)(1− θ(c−)) = σ − Y
′(c−)c−







+ p(1− ω1)P ′m(c−)
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